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this; Dr. Downer does not give it to us. Again, Dr. Downer's treatment of the Scriptures is, in general, influenced by his close adherence to the creeds. He even sees in certain passages indications of certain controversial victories which in their historical statement are metaphysical and not in the least interpretative of the New Testament mind. Another weakness is this: throughout the discussion the sacred distinctions in the Godhead seem to be absolute, and the author seems to convey to them the same distinct and separate self-hood as he himself is conscious of possessing. This fault is due not to adherence to the creeds but to an imperfect knowledge of the evolutionary use of the term "Person" by the creed-makers. This is a grave though general fault and works much mischief and is one from which the New Testament is free.

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PRAGMATISM AND MYSTICISM

The interest in viewing together the recent volumes of Professor Dewey¹ of Columbia and Professor Inge² of Cambridge is due to the extremely antithetical positions held by the two authors. It would not be unfair to characterize the former as an anti-mystical, or even, in ordinary senses of the term, anti-religious pragmatist, and the latter as an anti-pragmatic mystic. Neither of them seems to regard as worthy of consideration the attempt to transcend the opposition and reach a synthesis in religious pragmatism.

Professor Dewey has done a service to philosophical readers in republishing in the volume under review some of the most important of those acute and stimulating philosophical essays of his which have been appearing in various periodicals for more than a decade past. Moreover, viewing thus in better perspective the recent work of this significant thinker, one can detect more unmistakably the motives which underlie his philosophical work.

What one at least of these fundamental motives is, becomes abundantly clear from several passages in the book before us. It is nothing less than the complete eradication from philosophy of the last vestiges of the positively religious view of the universe. Toward this end the author makes his instrumentalism an instrument, and it is largely this

¹ *The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*. By John Dewey. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1910. vi+309 pages.

² *Faith and Its Psychology*. By William Ralph Inge. New York: Scribner, 1910. x+248 pages.

fact which accounts for the violently anti-metaphysical character of his pragmatism. It is a new and revised positivism, not based like Comte's upon the physical sciences primarily, but upon functional psychology.

To enter into particulars, one notes that Professor Dewey finds the significance of Darwinism for philosophy in its tendency to withdraw attention from such religio-philosophical questions as have to do with the origin, purpose, and destiny of all things. The endeavor to give a philosophical defense of belief in God, freedom, and immortality, is treated with ill-disguised contempt. The effort to substantiate a spiritual view of the universe is regarded as a mythologizing of reality, a mere survival of animism. No interest being felt in the validity of religious knowledge, epistemology is naturally (and justifiably, according to common-sense) dismissed on the ground that knowledge is not a mystery, but a natural event. In short, all metaphysics, it is held, is bound to decline and disappear, like the theology of which it is the last lingering shadow. Only psychology and social ethics are to be allowed to remain.

Out of his own mouth one is inclined to judge this pragmatic positivist, when he defines philosophy as "a Catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life," but the opening here for metaphysics is apparent only; for religion, in any significant sense of the word, is not regarded as one of the legitimate factors of life. Religion is held to be essentially pre-scientific, that blank submission of the individual, under the compulsion of external authority, to the blank reality beyond, a surrender which was an excusable weakness when tools were rare and clumsy and when, in general, man's command of the methods that control action was precarious and disturbed. Now, however, science is the recognized instrument for the maintenance even of moral values, and as such has fallen heir to the religious value formerly found in theological beliefs. Of course, then, if one admits that this is an adequate account of what religion is, not only is theology bound to go, but the chief element of interest in the problems of cosmology and epistemology likewise disappears.

To the support of his positivistic propaganda Professor Dewey brings powers of analysis, construction, and exposition that are worthy of a better cause. The essays entitled, "The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth," "Experience and Objective Idealism," and "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," for example, show the fruitfulness of the application of functional psychology to logical problems; while the his-

torical interpretations contained in the title-essay and in those on "Beliefs and Existences" and "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge" are most suggestive.

It is not necessary to attempt here an exposition of the now well-known and, as it seems to the reviewer, largely justified instrumentalism of Dewey's logical theory. It may be noted, however, that he expressly repudiates the narrow utilitarianism commonly charged against pragmatism, and defines truth cumbrously, but carefully, as "the union of abstract postulated meanings and concrete brute facts in a way that circumvents the latter by judging them from a new standpoint, while it tests concepts by using them as methods in the same active experience." He is not always equally careful, however. For example, when he asserts that the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same thing, and that the capacity of the idea to fulfil the purpose for which it was projected is equivalent to its truth, the ambiguity of statement certainly leaves his position exposed to the charge of being unduly subjective and individualistic. The idea may work effectively with reference to an unduly narrow or unjustifiable purpose, and yet not be true at all. And with reference to the statement that the pragmatic account of truth is nothing but a statement of its nature, one is inclined to ask whether pragmatism is not primarily a view of the *test* of truth, rather than a definition of its *nature*; and whether, further, it is not because pragmatists commonly pass uncritically from the one to the other that their important positive contribution still fails to meet with adequate appreciation. Or, to state the criticism differently, pragmatists become confusing when they speak, as Professor Dewey repeatedly does in the work before us, as if truth were a quality of ideas, instead of being, as it always is, a quality of judgments. And, inasmuch as judgments always involve a relation of ideas to reality, one may admit the essential contention of pragmatism, that the test of the truth of the judgment, however thoroughgoing, is always the testing of the usefulness of the idea, while still maintaining that the nature of truth is such a relation of idea to reality as makes possible adjustment to it with satisfaction to every interest that *ought* to be recognized. Thus the ideal character of truth is preserved, while its invariably practical test is recognized.

Professor Inge's book is one of the new "Studies in Theology" edited by Dr. Fairbairn. Some of the most marked features of the book are the admirable critique of external authority, the antagonism manifested toward pragmatism and Ritschlianism, and the decidedly

sympathetic attitude toward mysticism, it being this last well-known feature of Dr. Inge's thinking which makes him such an interesting figure in contemporary religious thought.

One cannot but regret that the author's criticism of pragmatism is not based upon a more intelligent appreciation of what that much-discussed philosophy essentially is. It is characterized as a philosophy of personal atomism, a skeptical opportunism, which habitually disparages the intellectual life. In short, he identifies it with the pseudo-pragmatism of modernist Catholics, such as Laberthonnière and LeRoy, who hold that, while many of the dogmas of the church are intellectually objectionable, they are to be regarded as symbols, so serviceable, practically, to the church and ultimately to life, that they are to be affirmed as true on the ground that all truths anyway are simply useful symbols. Now the fallacy here is obvious, and Dr. Inge's criticisms are undoubtedly valid as against this Catholic pragmatism, but they are pointless as directed against essential pragmatism.

But it is in mysticism that our author is specially interested. His central thesis is that the life of faith (intense subjective religion) admits us to an immediate experience of God. This faith is not to be grounded on mere feeling, but rational and practical tests are needed to enable one to distinguish genuine divine revelation. Thus a place is made for metaphysics in religious knowledge; but that there is involved in the practical criterion a virtual subjection of mystical knowledge to the pragmatic test, the author does not seem to realize. On the contrary, he regards the sane mysticism he intends to stand for, and the religious pragmatism he opposes, as mutually exclusive. For example, he says that Christ's knowledge of God must have been derived from direct personal union with God, or else have been only the intellectual concomitant of the right direction of his will. What is needed is a synthesis of these mutually supplementary elements.

The failure to sufficiently test in practical life the suggestions of the more pronounced and even abnormal states of the mystical experience leaves Dr. Inge favorably disposed to most of the peculiar doctrines of the extreme mystics. Thus, in addition to the religiously essential ideas of the immanence of God in human experience and the possibility of a genuine communion with God in the spiritual life, great value is attached to a mystical christology, the exalted Christ being identified with the Holy Spirit, and complaint being made against Ritschl for repudiating this doctrine. One finds also a favorable attitude expressed toward the view that the real world is timeless, a static heaven in which

desire and will have ceased to be. It should be recognized that this is a suggestion coming from the abnormal trance experience of the mystic, and that it is due to the inhibition of activity and the consequent intensely emotional character of such states. The fact that it does not work in practical life to so regard the real world should be decisive against the suggestion, even when it is supported by subsequent metaphysical speculation.

What seems desirable, then, is the fusion and mutual supplementation of pragmatism and mysticism. If pragmatism is to be saved from an ignoble utilitarianism, it must learn to appreciate and use as a fundamental norm the values experienced in vital personal religion. And if mysticism is to be anything but a form of spiritual dissipation it must submit all its insights and values to the test of practical life.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Professor Thomas C. Hall's *Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics*¹ presumably embodies some of his work with students at Union Theological Seminary, but in simplified form, adapted to the average reader. The language is as free as possible from technicalities, and there is a certain homeliness and common-sense in the method of discussion that is very satisfying and attractive.

He undertakes to examine one by one the various solutions proposed for the cure of social ills, to get whatever good each one contains, and to make clear its limitations and dangers. He speaks throughout from the point of view of the ethical man, rather than the political economist, but by no means as an amateur in his field of knowledge. The life and purpose of Jesus are his highest authority; the Bible, too, is authority, but only as historically understood and critically interpreted.

The book contains 32 chapters, most of them very brief, and there is nothing in the outward makeup to show the superficial or untaught reader that the thought is built up on larger lines. There are, in fact, four large divisions. The first ten chapters give the orientation; chaps. x-xvi give the social solutions proposed on the basis of individualism; chaps. xvii-xxi those based on "the social emphasis," i.e., socialism with

¹ *Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics*. By Thomas C. Hall. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1910. 390 pages. \$1.50.